DISEC

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TISKLMUN'26

Discussing the Prohibition and Prevention of Chemical Weapons Use and Proliferation

Discussing the Implementation of Fully Autonomous Weapons in War Zones

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Dais Introduction

Head Chair - Ethan

Good morning, good afternoon or good evening delegates! I'm Ethan and I'll be serving as your chair during your time at TISKLMUN'25. This'll be my 15th conference in general but my seventh as a chair, and only my third time as a head chair so like a lot of you, I'll be learning from this as well.

Now a little bit about myself: I'm a year 11 student from Taylor's Kuala Lumpur, I'll be 16 this year. I joined MUN 3 years ago because I absolutely loved to see how delegates interact and the drama that would unfold in a council session. So whether this be your first conference or your twenty first, I wish you all the best of luck after reading this research report. If you have any questions feel free to contact me or Aurelia through our socials listed below our introductions.

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Co-Chair - Aurelia

Hello fellow delegates! I am Aurelia and I will be serving as your co-chair in TISKLMUN'26. Truly an honour to have my first co-chairing experience outside of school grounds, and I am very much excited to see what heated debates will spark this council's interest. Regarding me personally, I attend St Joseph's Institution International School and am currently a 17 years old Y12 student. TISKLMUN marks my 8th conference in the MUN scene, and I have been doing MUN for a little over a year by now.

To whoever has a queasy stomach reading this research report (whether because you're just nervous as a first-timer or just... nervous) PLEASE don't worry. Every MUNer knows what it's like to be in the shoes of a scared delegate being bombarded by POIs, or rushing the position paper deadline to submit before 11.59pm (delegates please manage your time well). Which is why Ethan and I will promise to do our very best to support yall, so please do not hesitate to contact either of us for further inquiries when need be. All the best!

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Introduction to Council

The Disarmament & International Security Committee, abbreviated as DISEC, is the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and is of course among the six main committees established under the General Assembly. This council deals with matters related to disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that exert influence on the international community and seeks out solutions to encounter the challenges that harm the international security regime.

The formation of DISEC began in 1945 with the official establishment of the UN. The first historical event of the committee includes the adoption of Resolution 1(I), which is the very first General Assembly's resolution, regarding the "Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy", and was adopted by the First Committee on the 24th of January, 1946 in London. Another notable stepping stone is Resolution 1378 (XIV), which is the first General Assembly's resolution that was co-sponsored by all member states at that time.

The committee considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the United Nations Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations. At the same time, the committee upholds the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace

and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Furthermore, the committee promote cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.

On the other hand, DISEC is also an institution established under the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and often works closely with various other UN bodies, such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) which was established under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. The UNDC and Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament reports regularly to DISEC regarding any matter that requires the attention of the General Assembly.

Powers and Authority

DISEC sessions are structured into 3 distinctive stages:

1. **General debate:**

Addressing the general issues and concerns of arising incidents. Similar to the General Speakers List (GSL) of the MUN-based Rules of Procedures (ROP).

2. **Thematic discussions:**

Focus discussion on a particular aspect arising from the general debate. Similar to the Moderated Caucasus of the MUN-based Rules of Procedures (ROP).

3. **Action on drafts:**

Carrying out the discussed solutions / draft resolutions consented to by the majority of the council.

The work of this council falls under 7 thematic clusters:

1. Nuclear weapons
2. Other weapons of mass destruction
3. Outer space (disarmament aspects)
4. Conventional weapons
5. Regional disarmament and security
6. Other disarmament measures and international security
7. Disarmament machinery

Rules of Procedure

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) of TISKLMUN 2026 will be following the **Standardised Harvard Model United Nations (HMUN) Rules of Procedure**, which has been written and published by the Malaysian Youth Association for Diplomacy and Policy (MYADP). The official version of the MYADP HMUN Rules of Procedure can be found here.

Kindly note that the Board of Dais retains the right to modify the Rules of Procedure if deemed necessary for the progression of the council

Position Paper Guidelines

Position Papers are documents that detail your country's stance towards a particular issue. They are compulsory for the purposes of evaluation and potentially, for any awards. Being a key pre-conference feature of the Harvard Model United Nations (HMUN) Rules of Procedure, they allow for an overview of your country's stance and its suggested courses of action towards these issues that are being tackled by the committee. On the chairing front, it assists us in understanding your stance prior to the conference, allowing for us to cross-conference as needed. Undoubtedly, it also assists you as a delegate, being an important document for you to refer to during the conference, as to always be able to align yourself to your country's stances, be it during speeches or when proposing ideas!

Structure

The following is a simple overview of the typical structure of a Position Paper:

1. **Describe the topic in general.** It could be a description of the issue's history or its current implications across the globe.Tip, don't spend too much time on this.
2. **Describe how your country has been affected by the topic**. Identify examples of which the topic has affected your country. If there are no such equivalents, you may describe how it has affected suprantional organisations that your country is a part

-of (of which, you should explicitly mention your country is in fact part of it).

3. **Describe your country's stance towards the topic.** Speeches from its leaders (which should come from its current government), enacted policies or any material that can indicate your country's position should be stated here. You may split this section into actions taken in the domestic political arena or the international stage.
4. **Describe what solutions would your country propose.** They need not exactly be proposals that have been published by the actual government, but instead, perhaps a solution that a member of your government could potentially propose. Under no circumstance, however, should you propose a solution that is against your country's stance and interests. You would be sacked if this occurred in real life!
5. **Finally, have a conclusion.** You may summarize your stance or solutions once more.

Format

The following are the requirements you must follow for your Position Paper:

1. Position Papers are to be written in **English only** with a competent degree of formality. Any other languages applied throughout the papers will not be considered.
2. You must write for **both agendas**, in one single document. Submissions of more than one document will not be accepted.
3. Your Position Paper is limited to one page per topic and one bibliography for each agenda.
4. You must cite your sources. The **citation style is APA.**
5. You must include your full name, the name of the committee and your country at the beginning of your position paper.
6. You must answer in the view of the country that you are representing, not through the view of your personal opinions.
7. You must use the font Times New Roman at Size 11, in which the alignment must be Justified . All other options are at your convenience.
8. Usage of Bold, Italic, and Underline is allowed.
9. Please submit the Position Paper as a PDF file (.pdf).
10. Prior to submission, kindly name the Position Paper as "TISKLMUN 2026 - DISEC - [YOUR COUNTRY]", not inclusive of the quotation marks or brackets.

Submission

Kindly upload the document through this Google Form: https://forms.gle/Lqj2yjtzZdogW69o9

Any other method of submission shall not be accepted. The due date for the submission is 5th February 2026 11:59PM GMT+8. Kindly keep in mind that completion is required in order to be evaluated.

Workshop

As announced previously, the head chair will be conducting an informal position paper workshop on the 10th January 4:00PM GMT+8.

AGENDA 1: Evaluating the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Use and Proliferation

Keywords

Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA)	Chemical weapons are munitions and other devices which use the toxic effects of chemicals on living organisms to cause death or other harm
Nerve Agents	Blocks the Acetylcholinesterase (AChE) enzyme in the nervous system, which causes hyper-stimulation of muscles. The nerve agent category includes: Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD).
Blister/Vesicant Agents	Affects and irritates the eyes, respiratory tract, and skin and includes Sulfur Mustard (H, HD), Nitrogen Mustard (HN), Lewisite (L), and Phosgene oxime (CX).
Choking Agents	Irritates the nose, throat, and lungs when inhaled and includes Chlorine (Cl), Chloropicrin (PS), Diphosgene (DP), and Phosgene (CG).
Blood Agents	Blood agents inhibit the ability of cells to use oxygen and include Hydrogen Cyanide (AC), Cyanogen Chloride (CK), and Arsine (SA).

Dissemination	The methods by which a chemical agent is administered and distributed to a selected target. These methods include but are not limited to missiles, artillery and spray tanks.
Prohibition	To forbid the use or distribution of a subject by law
Proliferation	The rapid growth in the spread and use of chemical weapons by measure of manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, exporting, transferring, or stockpiling of chemical weapons and their delivery systems.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	Weapons capable of causing significant damage to infrastructure and high levels of mortality. UN definitions officially include nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons under this category.
Persistent Agents	Persistent agents can be generally described as being low in volatility; they can remain on surfaces or in environmental materials and surfaces for several days, weeks, or longer, presenting long-term inhalation and contact hazards

Introduction

"Chemical Weapons are something that scares everybody" - Abdallah II, King of Jordan.

A statement so simple but so innate to our understanding of these weapons of mass destruction, weapons with the capability to cause unparalleled loss of life. In our modern day, both the United Nations(UN) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) have worked tirelessly to ensure these atrocities may never occur. As of the time of writing, all declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been confirmed destroyed; this stands as a significant milestone in the complete eradication of these weapons across the globe.

Despite this progress, there remain many challenges in the path to a better world devoid of chemical weapons. Whilst all nations party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) no longer maintain chemical weapons, there remain UN nations that are not party to the CWC and several more countries that are believed to violate its commitments as per the CWC.

In recent developments, Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, have condemned perpetrators of chemical weapons proliferation in Syria after evidence of nerve agents was found in a site in Syria with information suggesting that over 100 additional locations may be involved with chemical weapons in the country. This event signals the fact that the threat of chemical weapons is by no means over, and the terrifying potential of undeclared or hidden chemical weapons stands as a serious concern for the OPCW.

In addition to this threat, there exists a key roadblock that has yet to be adequately dealt with on the international stage: non-state actors(NSAs), entities not governed by national and international bodies that take advantage of dual-use chemicals to develop weapons that disrupt essential infrastructure and cause unprecedented numbers of casualties for a fraction of the cost of other weapons.

The most obvious example of this would be the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), believed to be responsible for 2% of all chemical weapons attacks in Syria and has been proven to be responsible for the use of sulphur mustard attacks in capturing the town of Marae.

These stand as the primary issues on the table, and the focal point of this council and agenda, the fundamental need to eradicate the evil of chemical weapons cannot be ignored. To do this, international bodies like DISEC must tackle these two issues: Undeclared chemical stockpiles and NSAs.

Background

Historical Context

Since the dawn of time, humanity has sought ways to kill each other more effectively; war has sparked necessary innovation to overcome a threat.

Which is why it comes as no surprise that some evidence suggests that the use of chemical warfare predates civilization itself; around 10000 BCE, people in modern day South Africa would dip arrows in chemical agents and use them to fend off enemies. This remains the first recorded

instance of Chemical Weapons being used in history; however, there is a lack of a thorough account of these events, meaning this cannot be confirmed.

Comparatively, the first confirmed instance of chemical warfare is recorded much later in the 6th Century BCE; the Siege of Kirrha, a pivotal event in the first sacred war, saw Athenian soldiers lace the city's water supply with poisonous hellebore plants. This use of chemical warfare would become a staple of siege technique as a means of cutting off access to essential resources. Such techniques are now almost universally considered atrocious acts, considered a crime against humanity and a war crime under International Humanitarian Law(IHL).

Advancing to a more modern period, the 19th century saw some of the greatest atrocities ever seen across the globe. A perfect example of this would be the French Conquest of Algeria, which saw the systematic destruction of entire tribes, decimating the native population. To this day, it is hotly debated whether this event constituted genocide, though Algerian officials and many historians agree that their desire to annihilate the native population and aggressive actions met all criteria for genocide. Another notable atrocity during this conquest would be when French soldiers forced 1000 members of a Berber Tribe into a cave and executed them using smoke. Considering the previous statements regarding genocide, this act would be the first large-scale use of chemical warfare for genocide, and unfortunately, it would not be the last.

Whilst the Berber tribe massacre during the French conquest of Algeria was the first significant case of chemical warfare used for genocide, the .

infamous Nazi gas chambers are by far the largest and most egregious case of it. But before we can discuss this, we first need to cover a little context.

In case you are not aware, from 1939 to 1945, the world bore witness to what is still regarded as some of the most disturbing atrocities recorded not just in recent history but in world history. It was during this period that the Third Reich in Germany fielded two campaigns: 1 of war, the takeover of Europe, and 1 of brutality, the attack on entire groups of people. To elaborate, the Nazi's believed in a highly radical hypernationalist ideology, with the ideal of a perfect Aryan race, and in the pursuit of this ideal, the Nazis persecuted almost any group that didn't fit it, most notably the Jewish people; throughout World War 2, over 6 million Jews were killed in a mass genocide, known as the holocaust. It's also worth noting that the Nazis committed many atrocities towards several groups of individuals, including but not limited to: Homosexuals, Soviet prisoners of war, Poles, black people and disabled people.

Additionally it is commonly known that the Nazis frequently utilized chemical warfare, this is where we return to the infamous gas chambers. These gas chambers, or disinfection areas as the Nazis called it, were used throughout the war; the most famous iteration today would be the ones used in Auschwitz after September of 1941, utilising Zyklon B, a blood agent inhibiting our cells' use of oxygen. Zyklon B, originally developed as a commercial pesticide, would prove to be abused by the Nazis to kill approximately 1.1 million people throughout WW2.

Another notable chemical used by Nazis was carbon monoxide(CO), an asphyxiant used throughout WW2, most relevant being its use to execute 70000 disabled individuals in the fall of 1939. The Nazi's and other instances of chemical agents eventually led to the rise and ratification of numerous treaties pertaining to chemical weapons following WW2, explained further in the next subsection.

Past & Current Convention/Agreements

Strasbourg Agreement (1675)

Whilst not of monumental significance to modern day chemical weapons agreements, the Strasbourg Agreement represents a historical milestone as the first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons dating back to 1675, when France and Germany came to an agreement, signed in Strasbourg, prohibiting the use of poison bullets.

Geneva Protocol (1925)

From 4 May to 17 June 1925, the Geneva protocol was drafted at the conference for the supervision of the international trade in arms and ammunition under the League of Nations. The conference adopted a convention for the supervision of the international trade in arms, munitions and implements of war which has not entered into force and, as a separate document, a protocol on the use of gasses. Essentially this document primarily focuses on prohibiting the use of poisonous, asphyxiating and other gasses as well as bacterial warfare. Today these protocols stand as one of the most successful treaties on chemical warfare in history with 36 signatory states and 146 states parties.

Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC) (1997)

Perhaps the most important chemical weapons treaty in history, the CWC is a multilateral treaty prohibiting the use, stockpiling and proliferation of chemical weapons as well as requiring all states party to the CWC must destroy chemical weapons stockpiles within 10 years of ratification. The CWC is of unlimited duration and will never expire. As of the time of writing the CWC has 193 states-parities.

Points of Contention

Non-State Actors

Whilst state actors are bound by international treaties, the same laws and agreements do not apply to NSAs. There is no internationally agreed upon regulation of chemical agents for NSAs, apart from the CWC stating states should deny NSAs the means to acquire chemical weapons, instead most regulation is up to domestic policy.

NSAs present the most terrifying threat as they are an uncontrollable foreign entity separate from any government. Terrorist cells have utilized lax regulations in the past to acquire precursors to chemical weapons and have utilised them against the public, threatening both the state and civilians. Additionally any regulation of typical markets for chemical weapon precursors may be of little effect due to the presence of illicit trade and black market resources giving NSAs access to these chemicals.

A threat like this cannot be ignored and must be handled swiftly with international consensus.

Dual Use Technology/Chemicals

The simple issue with many chemicals is the fact that they serve many purposes, what can be classified as a vesicant agent may also have application in medicine and sanitation, which brings to mind the dilemma of how to regulate these chemicals; over-regulation may lead to individuals not getting essential medicine, but under-regulation means there remains the possibility of these chemicals falling into the wrong hands, maybe even supplying NSAs with the tools they need to commit terrorism.

Historically speaking, dual-use chemicals have already led to gross misuse, costing millions of lives. As previously mentioned under the historical context section, the primary blood agent used in Nazi gas chambers, Zyklon B, originated as a cyanide-based pesticide commonly used for fumigating ships and warehouses as well as disinfecting clothes and killing insects. It continued to be used for these purposes from 1920 to 1941, until the Nazis realised it made for an effective killing method, eventually being used to take over 1.1 million lives.

Needless to say, the complete restriction of dual-use chemicals may lead to immense tragedy, and the misuse of dual-use chemicals has led to some of the worst tragedies in history, as well as risking domestic threats. It is necessary that a balance is found on the spectrum of regulation.

Universal Compliance

A fundamental issue with almost any treaty is that, whilst countries may sign and ratify agreements, there is no guarantee they will adhere to them. As of 2024, it has already been confirmed that at least 4 countries are in violation of the CWC, and China may not be meeting its obligations under the CWC, though results remain inconclusive. In addition to that, 4 states remain not party to the CWC: Israel, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Sudan and Egypt. So long as there remain countries non-party to the CWC and nothing is done against violators of the CWC, universal compliance will remain impossible.

Currently, the primary issue lies in the fact that the CWC is not enforceable, thus little action can be taken against nations that choose to violate it.

Measures recommended by the CWC only include sanctions and referral to the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) for further action, but this means little, as Russia, a UNSC veto power, is known to violate the CWC and China, another veto power, is suspected to be in violation of the CWC.

Any future resolutions or treaties must consider a way to encourage universal compliance without exacerbating political tensions.

Crowd Control Chemical Agents

Under Article II (9)(d)of the CWC, the use of chemical weapons for purposes of law enforcement, including riot control, is listed as a purpose not prohibited under the CWC, meaning chemical agents such as tear gas and pepper spray for riot control are legal under international agreements. However, the use of the same chemical agents, tear gas and pepper spray, is strictly prohibited for warfare.

Many individuals and proponents against the use of chemical weapons critique the use of these agents for any purpose, citing how, despite being deemed "less lethal", they still can cause casualties and serious injury. Many also point out the hypocrisy of these chemical agents being considered too dangerous for war but safe enough for domestic issues involving civilians.

It is the responsibility of countries to decide where the line is drawn for the use and regulation of chemical agents, to decide what separates pepper spray and mustard gas.

There still remains a lack of a binding agreement due to the retention of sovereignty in relation to influencing domestic policy.

Emerging Technology

It is in the nature of all scientific fields that they are always changing and ever-evolving as more advancements and progress are made. Whilst obviously research into chemical warfare is not condoned by most governments and institutions, dual-use chemicals mean that progress in this field can continue unintentionally. This possibility of evolution means that past resolutions and treaties will almost definitely become outdated with time.

Currently, as most countries have ratified and adhered to the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) has been increasing its focus on two subjects: 1, as mentioned previously, is violations of the CWC, but the other is a safeguard against the future in how dual use chemicals relate to emerging technology. This is done to ensure that the CWC remains relevant and inclusive of all concurrent threats.

Organisations similar to the OPCW cannot only focus on solving the issues of today but must also prepare for the threats of tomorrow.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

1. How will nerve, vesicant, choking and blood agents be regulated differently?

2. How can compliance to the CWC and future chemical weapons treaties be ensured?

3. How can the abuse of dual use chemicals be avoided?

4. How will it be ensured that all nations understand and are equipped to identify and decontaminate chemical weapons in emergency scenarios?

5. How will illicit trade and tracking of chemical weapons be detected and managed?

6. How can emerging forms of chemical warfare be classified and regulated under existing treaties?

7. How can we ensure treaties such as the CWC are completely universal?

8. How will chemical agents be regulated in regards to NSAs?

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AGENDA 2: Discussing the Implementation of Fully Autonomous Weapons in War Zones

Keywords

War Zone	A region experiencing ongoing military conflict or a designated area currently where the rights of neutral are not respected by the nations at war.
Autonomous Weapons Systems	• Artificial agent with the ability to change its internal state to achieve a specific goal(s) or command(s), without the direct intervention of another agent. • Deployed with some or no human intervention. • Able to identify, select, or attack a target with no intervention from another agent(s) or AWS.
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems	• Specific type of AWS Can patrol a designated area, autonomously identify an 'enemy', and fire at the target without human intervention or confirmation.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)	• Basically drones • Flying mechanisms without a human pilot via controlling remotely or autonomously

Unmanned Weapon System (UWS)	Can be classified into 3 different categories from full human control to higher levels of autonomy: • Remotely operated systems • Automated systems • Systems that operate autonomously These categories allow existing weapons systems and AWS to be clearly distinguished. Delegates must navigate the different legal, ethical, and political considerations.
Meaningful Human Control (MHC)	The principle for the need of moral human agency to retain ultimate responsibility on the use of force.
Human-in-the-loop (HITL) **Semi autonomous**	• An AI system with active human oversight in decision-making or control processes. • Ensures critical commands are approved by humans before deployment.
Human-on-the-loop (HOTL) **Supervised autonomous**	• An AI system with limited human oversight, operating mostly autonomously. • Allows humans to only monitor, intervene, or override the system when necessary.

Introduction

Paired with the rapid integration of AI systems, Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) have made society susceptible to the rise of full automation. Recent advancements have led to AWS independently select, identify, and launch attacks at targets with varying degrees of human oversight, relying on sensor-based decision making from computerised algorithms. Developers have argued for such systems to minimise human casualties on the battlefield and propel human warfare; critics suggest this dehumanises war, removing human judgement and morality by giving the authority of life to a 'killer robot'.

As depicted by plagued war zones, the deployment of AWS often blur the lines between states acting in 'defense' or 'offense', raising critical concerns about escalation and the underlying issues of distinguishing the enemy from a civilian. Questions continue to arise over accountability, morality, and its compliance with the three core pillars of International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Distinction, Proportionality, and Precautions.

On the other hand, this technological edge and strategic advantage to enhance national security cannot be overlooked. The deployment of AWS in perilous combat zones reduces the risk of human casualties on the battlefield, with its ability to process vast amounts of data rapidly and execute precise targeting decisions making it revolutionary. Moreover, issues of long

This agenda seeks to bring the world to a general consensus on whether to regulate, ban, or implement Fully Autonomous Weapons (FAWs). Consider the general concerns or praise for its integration into the warzone, and how to ensure this act does not violate IHL protocol, or even the notions of Meaningful Human Control (MHC). Perhaps delegates should remain open to the idea of balancing technological innovation with ethical and legal convention, to prevent violations of established norms alongside necessary advancements.

Background

Historical Context

Early 1980s

- Global Positioning System ('GPS')
- Advances in telecommunications → allows Unmanned Weapons Systems (UMS) to operate at greater distances
- Invention of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
    - Remotely operated
    - Combat operations for purposes of intelligence/surveillance/targeting/reconnaissance (ISTR)
    - Also as decoys

Delegates must remain wary of the use of UAVs in today's context; later developments have seen increased employment of UAVs in numbers, and heavy proliferation in terms of its many various roles.

Late 19th Century

Increased development of **UMS** to carry **ordnance** mounted guns/artillery

- Stemming from the need for an advantageous front, Nikola Tesla attempted to develop an unmanned naval system to deliver ordnance.
- Developing unmanned airborne systems and land-based systems which would deliver ordnance after covering a certain distance or operate via a cable mechanism

However, none were employed in widespread combat.

2000s

- Developments aim towards greater autonomy, and are expected to continue going forward.

Defensive weapon systems with autonomous capabilities are in deployment (e.g. missile defense systems - delegates can look more into this)

Recent developments in technology

Recent developments in AI autonomy are at an all-time high, but certain advancements have been used with malicious intent, and should be highlighted by delegates.

Mechanisms used in the Russo-Ukrainian War

- Electronic warfare
- Increased role of robotics in logistics
- Casualty retrieval
- Portable jamming devices
- Helped address the lack of skilled human operators
- Frontline resupply
- Identifying targets using facial recognition

Drones

December 2025: U.S. Navy unmanned combat drone (LUCAS)

Concerns on mechanisms being shifted from human-in-the-loop to human-on-the-loop; human oversight is slowly deteriorating.

Germany's New Addition

September 2025: CA-1 Europa

- New autonomous combat drone set to fly on 2027
- Cheaper & more easily dispensable than fighter jets

Recent additions to the autonomous force has also seen increased shipping to other nations, marking the concerns of AI-controlled weapons a widespread issue.

Reasons for the Intergration of AWS

The world is convinced of the real and perceived advantages of unmanned systems, with many often in favour of deploying AWS, or generally any unmanned military system in general.

Arguments include:

Increased Military Capabilities

- Able to prolong missions with greater speed and precision in detecting and aiming at targets.
- Leading to many civilian casualties

Lack of vulnerability to physical/psychological limitations

- Exhaustion/pain/hunger
- Fear/anger/instinct for self-preservation

Predicted force multiplication/strengthening

Greater military capability while cutting back on personnel deployed

Increased Transparency

Via use of recording devices

Impact of Issue on Key Stakeholders

Despite the game-changing autonomy that AI invites, it has equally struck many legal questions for various stakeholders. With the increased implementation and development of AWS, ambiguity in judicial matters continue to persist, or even worsen.

Right to War

- AWS employment does not necessarily mean that the said operation is illegal, under the rules of the 'right to war'
- Many would label the use of AWS to combat terrorist organisations as having a right to war, but it is often more so due to the type of weapon used and the existence of official consent and fulfills:
    - Prior approval from the UN Security Council
    - Consent by target State

As an act of self-defense **(delegates may consider navigating this ambiguous debate first)**

International Human Rights Law

Delegates can consider researching the following articles which protect civilians from unlawful killing:

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966)
- Customary International Law

IHRL prohibits the targeting of an individual solely based on their status. The use of lethal force is only allowed in defence of arbitrary violence, and if it follows the guidelines below:

- Follows proportionality thresholds under the application human rights regime
- Planned, prepared, and conducted in a way with minimal use of lethal force.

International Humanitarian Law

Applies to international or non-international armed conflict

- The principle of proportionality outlines the need to minimise civilian damage
- The attack would be prohibited if excessive in terms of its perceived military advantage

Fully autonomous weapons are bound to defy IHL principles.

Delegates can consider briefly discussing uncertainties on whether IHL or IHRL applies as a result of increased implementation, and how modern laws are often outdated.

The State is considered to be the most prominent stakeholder in a nation's context, but among them also include:

1. *Civilians*
2. *Military forces and commanders*
3. *Governmental experts and policymakers (UNGGE)*

Civilians-as a primary stakeholder-are the ones suffering from security concerns:

- Life-and-death decisions being given to machines
- Risk of casualties to own army
- Algorithmic bias
- Large-scale proliferation
- Risks of non-state actors using such mechanisms for malicious intent

Past and Current Conventions/Agreements

Currently there are no legally binding conventions/agreements *specifically* towards the implementation of fully autonomous weapons.

Certain Conventional Weapons

- Main international forums which discusses autonomous weaponry
- Beginning 2014, this body has held annual meetings with experts on LAWS & potential regulation.
- Large state participation, yet no legally binding agreements to date.

Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy

- 2023: Signed by the United States, eventually signed by 60+ countries
- Specifically outlines commitments by states on how AI should cater to military contexts

Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence

- 2o23: Under Council of Europe
- Sets standards for AI in alignment with human rights and the rule of law

Points of Contention

Transparency of Budget Allocations

Delegates must consider the extent of transparency in the allocation of funds to ensure it is used responsibly. Funds are bound to be allocated towards developing nations for research, development, and logistical measures. How will you ensure this alongside respect for national sovereignty?

Involvement of Human Oversight

Delegates should consider the extent of human oversight on FAWs, especially during its early stages where humans must take control during potential faults.

Extent of Regulation

Delegates should consider whether voluntary guidelines, or even strict adherence of terms will be implemented. Delegates can also discuss partial or outright bans.

Legal Accountability

Delegates must outline all possible stakeholders within its production. Discuss how they will be accountable during cases of unlawful killing. This is key especially during the early stages of implementing such volatile mechanisms.

Dual Use AI Systems

Delegates must understand that this is a grey area within FAWs, & can easily be exploited for malicious intent, or ceased by aggressors.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

1. Will Fully Autonomous Weapons be completely outlawed, regulated, or partially banned?

2. What is the clear global definition of "Fully Autonomous Weapons (FAWS)" agreed upon by all state members?

3. How can you ensure that the full implementation of AWS will not compromise civilian lives? Ensure a tangible plan of action.

4. What is the extent of human involvement within these Fully Autonomous Weapons? When is human supervision required by following the conventions of Meaningful Human Control (MHC)

5. What is considered as offensive and defensive action within a warzone?

6. What measures of accountability will be placed towards state aggressors, or even when a violation occurs?

7. Will there be oversight mechanisms to monitor activity, especially in regards to responsible use of budget allocations?

8. Are key principles-IHL, IHRL, MHC-being compromised? If so, to what degree and why is this viable within the context of warzones?

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